FOR RELEASE AT 9:00 P.M. EST
26 JANUARY 1960
Approved For Release 2000/08/24 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000100200020-6

ADDRESS
BY
ALLEN W. DULLES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TO
THE HONORS NIGHT DINNER
INSTITUTE OF AERONAUTICAL SCIENCES
26 JANUARY 1960
HOTEL ASTOR, NEW YORK CITY

In addressing this 28th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, I trust that you will bear with me if I reminisce a bit about the art and techniques of intelligence in the nuclear-ballistic age.

Your membership includes many who have made a great contribution to the overall efficiency of our intelligence collection and analysis.

When your Director, Mr. Paul Johnston, suggested that I meet with you tonight, I could not refuse him. He has never turned me down when I asked his help. Your new President, General Don Putt, is also an old friend who has made a very real contribution to intelligence. You have chosen well.

One of the most satisfying aspects of our work in the intelligence field has been the contribution that leaders in the field of science and technology have made to it. I have never known a time when we have called upon any of you and your colleagues in various fields of

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scientific endeavor without having a wholehearted response, no matter the time, the trouble and the sacrifice involved. I want to thank you now, and through you, your colleagues in other scientific fields.

In the Central Intelligence Agency we have built up an Office of Scientific Intelligence under the able direction of Dr. Herbert Scoville. It is prepared to meet our growing responsibilities in the field of science and to serve as a point of liaison with you and others in the scientific community.

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There is something about intelligence that seems to get into the blood.

My own relationship to intelligence goes back at least 40 years when as a young foreign service officer I became involved in intelligence work during World War I; - first in Austria-Hungary before we entered the war, then in Switzerland and later at the Peace Conference of Versailles in 1919.

Then again I came back to intelligence work for about four years in World War II. I shall not soon forget the day back in the spring of 1943 when I secured my first hard evidence of the German development at Peenemunde of its missiles, the V-1 and the V-2. I can truthfully say that my background in missile intelligence goes back about seventeen years. It remains our highest priority.

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With the end of World War II, I settled back into the practice of the law. But again I could not resist the lure of the trade and in 1948 I accepted President Truman's invitation to join with two fellow lawyers in preparing, for the National Security Council, a study on the legislation which had set up the Central Intelligence Agency. I refer to the National Security Act of 1947, which also established the Department of Defense, -- provided for the unification of the military services -- and established the National Security Council.

The CIA had then been functioning only about a year, but the question was whether its legislative framework was adequate for the job. In due course, after a year of intermittent work, we submitted our report and considered our job completed. We had, however, committed the unpardonable sin of telling others how a job should be done. I warn you all not to do this unless you are looking for trouble.

Shortly after our report was filed in 1949, that dynamic military man and diplomat, General Bedell Smith, who is today fighting a brave, and I believe successful, battle against critical illness, was named Director of Central Intelligence. He dusted off the report of our little committee, and in his inimitable manner, called the authors of the report on the telephone, and told us in no

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uncertain terms that we should come down to Washington for a few weeks and try to explain what we were trying to say, and if it made sense, help him put it into effect.

We could not fail to respond, and so about ten years ago I went to work at the Central Intelligence Agency for a six week's tour of duty. I have been there ever since.

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The years since 1947, when the CIA was organized, have hardly been sufficient to put everything in order. In fact, if in intelligence one ever reaches any such state of complacency, it's about time to have one's head examined. I do feel, however, that real progress has been made over the last dozen years, but intelligence will never be an exact science. It deals not only with the hardware of national power and of battle, but with the vagaries and uncertainties of human beings and human decisions. There are always scores of intangibles and unpredictables, and in fact "unknowables."

The best one can do is to see that one's batting average is relatively high, that the predictable and the calculable are stated with the degree of certainty that the evidence permits, and that the best that one can distill out of available facts is brought concisely, objectively and quickly to those who have the responsibility for policy and action.

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Courage is also needed. Intelligence officers are all too prone to write their estimates so that no matter what happens they will have covered themselves. With this I have no patience.

In this intelligence task science, technology, electronics and the aeronautical and affiliated sciences play a major role. I regret to state that the days are gone where one could place chief reliance on such tools of collection as the wiles of a Mata Hari. The beats of an electronic signal have come into their own. It takes some of the glamour out of the profession, but these scientific techniques do add an element of more certainty. And in the age of jet propulsion and ballistic missiles, speed and precision of reporting are two of the vital elements of our security.

Of course as the means of intelligence collection become more highly mechanized and complicated, the cost of intelligence to the taxpayer, like everything else, is ascending and there is a need constantly to justify the money and the manpower which is put into it.

If there is abroad a general impression, as I sometimes read in the press, that the work and cost of intelligence collection must be taken solely on faith and on the claims of the intelligence officer, I should like to scotch any such idea. More and more, in the budgetary processes of government we are called upon to justify, in detail, the

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work for which the taxpayer is paying by the results we are achieving.

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It is probably not necessary to explain to a gathering such as this the need for intelligence. Sometimes, however, I do feel that a good share of the public considers intelligence work as a collateral need rather than a direct and vital element of our national security. History, I think, clearly gives the lie to any such conclusion.

Sometime I should like to find the leisure to write a book on the impact of intelligence successes and failures on the course of history. One might start with the Trojan Horse in 1200 B.C. when no one would listen to Cassandra and with the fatal campaign of the Athenians against Syracuse. Coming down to more modern times, one could debate the consequences of the miscalculation of the Kaiser in 1914, and of Hitler in World War II, and not overlook our own Pearl Harbors.

Then there are the spectacular successes, like those of the highly competent spies of Joshua, who found shelter in Jericho with Rahah the harlot, and the much more recent feat of British intelligence in deciphering the Zimmerman telegram in 1917, and the American intelligence prelude to the great victory in the Battle of Midway.

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In time of war intelligence is often dramatic. In peacetime good intelligence rarely is spectacular. It can and ought to be quiet, inconspicuous, painstaking, but also guiding and safeguarding. It should warn in advance, and help to stave off crises. It should also help affirmatively toward the development of a dynamic policy and strategy. If it does its job properly it may never need to be sensational; it should not be publicized.

It is not my contention that all of the failures could have turned into successes even if the intelligence had been near perfection and been heeded, and even if the political and military leaders of the past who were interpreting the intelligence had always had the wisdom of Socrates. Neither situation prevailed.

It is my contention, however, that it is possible somewhat to narrow the range of miscalculation by the continual improving of our intelligence, and by perfecting the methods by which we get that intelligence quickly and clearly to those who have the duty of making great decisions. Here we are making real progress.

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The experience of World War II taught us something which countries like the United Kingdom and most of the major European powers had learned well before us, namely, that an effective intelligence system is important to national security.

In reaching this same decision in 1947 we did not attempt, and I believe wisely, to creat a unitary system. Rather it is a coordinated, integrated system. The Central Intelligence Agency has large responsibilities for coordinating the overall intelligence effort, but does not supplant the work of other agencies.

In the United States Intelligence Board, over which I have the honor to preside, we bring together the intelligence representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, of the Military Services, and others who have capabilities in the collection field or in the analysis of intelligence. Included on the Board are representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to aid where domestic intelligence matters have international implications, and of the Atomic Energy Commission with its expertise in the nuclear field. Of course we draw upon the great knowledge and experience of private organizations such as those which so many of you represent and we benefit from the wisdom of our scholastic and educational institutions.

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The United States Intelligence Board has the responsibility for analyzing all relevant intelligence collected by, or available to, all agencies of government. The resultant product, in the form of coordinated memoranda and estimates, attempts to cover, on a world-wide basis, the developing trends, military, political and economic, which bear upon our national security.

It is our purpose to get our estimates out in time to be of use. Post mortems of lost opportunities are valuable to help us improve for the future; they are of little use in developing a policy for the present.

The responsibility for effecting the coordination of intelligence and issuing the resulting product lies with the Central Intelligence Agency.

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The analysis of human behavior, the anticipation of human reactions in a given situation, can never be assigned to a computer machine, and sometimes baffles the cleverest analyst. We have, it is true, drawn up long lists of crises indicators to be checked off in various situations where belligerent or hostile actions are threatened. These lists, based on long experience, are useful but the future is rarely like the past; and we only have some forty years'

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experience in dealing with International Communism of the Moscow variety and ten years' experience with Communism directed from Peiping.

Today in the Soviet Union more information is becoming available to the outside world than was the case in the past. This applies particularly to the development of Soviet peacetime economy, their competence in the various peaceful industrial fields, and their problems in trying to apply Marxist theories in agriculture, which has proved to be a costly and unsuccessful undertaking.

In the military area, however, the Soviets attempt, even today, to maintain as strict a veil of secrecy as in the old times of Stalin. As an exception from time to time Mr. Khrushchev himself, as he has done in his own recent "State of the Nation" address, tells us of his plans. Now he proposes to reduce his military manpower to phase over from the bomber to the guided missile, and largely to abandon surface naval vessels and emphasize the submarine. Of course we have to analyze his statements in order to determine what part is hard fact and what part is said to beguile us.

The Kremlin's security is good, but a great deal is known to Intelligence beyond the trickle of military information that is given out officially. In fact, the greater part of what Khrushchev has now

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told us about this military planning had been anticipated many months ago, and long since our estimates had been revised to take account of the slackening in aircraft production, the change in emphasis in the Navy and the Soviet's vigorous and orderly program in the field of guided missiles.

The proposed reduction in military manpower comes somewhat belatedly as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. We ourselves had done this much earlier. For the Soviet it is in part a response to the change in emphasis as a result of new weaponry. It is also calculated to help meet the requirements of their industry for more manpower during this period when the Soviet is feeling the effects of the reduced birth rate of the war years.

Even after these announced reductions, however, we should not forget that the Soviets would retain a formidable balanced military establishment, in no way wholly dependent on their missile strength.

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The stress which Khrushchev has laid on ballistic missiles, or rockets as he prefers to call them, and the resultant discussion in the Congress and in the Press about where we stand in the missile race, has recently directed considerable attention to intelligence estimates. There seems to be some confusion about what I might

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call the methodology in their preparation. I should like to try to set this straight.

First: Our intelligence estimates do not attempt to give a comparative picture or net estimate as to where we stand vis-a-vis the USSR in weaponry. We, in Intelligence, are not authorities on American military programs. Naturally our own domestic experience and our knowledge as to the state of the art in this country, are useful guides in judging others capabilities. Our job is to determine where the Soviet Union now stands in the missile and other military fields, and where it is going in the immediate future. We are not in the business of passing upon whether there is such a thing as a missile gap.

Second: The analysis of any given Soviet weapons system involves a number of judgments. These include, for example: Soviet capability to produce the system; probable Soviet inventories of the weapons system as of today; the role assigned to this system in Soviet military planning; the requirements the Soviet high command may lay down for the weapon over the future. All these judgments are to some degree interdependent. They lead to a calculation of how far and how soon the Soviets are likely to develop the system. Manifestly this kind of estimating is of the highest importance to our own planning.

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Third: It is difficult to predict how much emphasis will be given to any particular weapons system until the research and development stage has been completed, tests of effectiveness have been carried out and the factories given the order to proceed with serial production. No group of people knows this better than you do as regards our own military program. Consequently in our estimates we generally stress capabilities in the early stages of Soviet weapons development and then, as more hard facts are available, we estimate their probable programming, sometimes referred to as intentions.

Finally: What I am describing is not a new or novel procedure. Every estimate of this nature regarding military hardware, irrespective of the type of weapon, whether it be a missile, a submarine or an airplane goes through this general process of analysis in the intelligence community and has done so for many years. First we assess the Soviet capabilities in each of these fields and then as the evidence accumulates and as a pattern begins to emerge, we reach our estimate as to the likely construction program.

The fact that in the later years of development we can crank into our estimates more of the elements of programming and future intentions than we can at the beginning does not indicate any change in the intelligence approach to the problem. It merely means that

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our sources of information in one year may permit of a judgment which is always needed by the planner, but one which could not have been properly made earlier.

For example in 1954 the Soviets began production of a heavy bomber comparable to our B-52. Every indication pointed to their having adopted this plane as a major element of their offensive strength and to an intention to produce these planes more or less as fast as they could. Based on our knowledge of their aircraft manufacturing industry we projected a build-up of this bomber force over the succeeding several years. We were certain that they had the capability to produce the numbers forecast; the available evidence indicated that they had the intention to translate this capability into a program.

But we naturally kept a close watch on the actual events. Production did not rise as rapidly as it could have. Evidence accumulated that the performance of the plane was less than satisfactory. Meanwhile we noted progress in their missile testing program. At some point about 1957 the Soviet leaders decided that the heavy bomber production should be held down to a minimum. In those days, some people in this country were writing about the coming bomber gap.

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As we gained evidence of that change in program, it became incumbent on us to revise our intelligence estimates and we did so. The capability remained, the policy and hence the intent to go forward with the heavy bomber changed. This Khrushchev himself has now announced in his recent speech. In the field of naval surface forces and conventional submarines, Soviet policy went through a similar cycle in order to prepare for more sophisticated types of submarines. This has recently been alluded to by Khrushchev but was known to the intelligence community for many months.

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In citing these examples of cutbacks in the numbers of Soviet bombers and submarines, I do not wish to leave any impression that I think the Soviets will do the same in the long-range missile field. During this past year they have been carrying on an orderly program of flight-testing their missiles which permits certain conclusions to be drawn. Most recently, presumably for the propaganda effects they hope to gain, and because they were running out of homeland space in which to test, they have advertised where in the Pacific they proposed to target the tests of their space vehicles or "rockets" for the month ending February 15. Thus they flex their muscles in public whereas in the past they have been doing it without publicity. They wish to call attention to the strength of their sinews.

There is no tendency in the intelligence community to underestimate Soviet sophistication in any phase of the missile field, or the progress they have been making in developing their long-range missile system. We have not downgraded this system this year as contrasted with last year.

However it would be just as wrong to let the Soviet talk the world into believing that the ICBM, powerful as it is, constitutes the only armament with which a country should equip itself. I believe that the Soviet are trying to take advantage of the publicity they have achieved with respect to both missile and space programs in order to make the

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unsophisticated believe that these achievements mean overall superiority in the military field. Such superiority, in the opinion of more qualified experts than I, does not exist.

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In viewing problems such as the Soviet strategic attack capabilities with missiles and other weapons, we in the Intelligence Community are keenly aware of the impact which intelligence estimates may have upon our own military posture and our military programming. I can assure you that in preparing them we look to nothing but the available facts, disregarding all outside considerations, political, budgetary or other. At times we have overestimated. At times we have underestimated. But looking back on the last few years with the benefit of hindsight, the record of estimating is creditable. Facts have no politics. We are diligently seeking and interpreting the facts without fear or favor.

As regards the influence of a particular department or service on our estimative process, I recognize that we are all human and have our prejudices and our strong convictions. I can also assure you that we have such a level of responsibility representing a broad cross-section of both civilian and military participation on the United States Intelligence Board that there is little opportunity for parochial interests or considerations of any member to influence the final product. But if any

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member of the Board has a dissenting view on any issue, that member is entitled to express it as part of the estimate so that the policy maker can judge of it as such.

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In addition to reaching soun d intelligence judgments on the crucial issues of the day, the other major problem of the intelligence officer is to get the reports and estimates before the decision-making echelons of government. In our own government, this means of course that the intelligence goes primarily to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. The latter is, in effect, the President in Council, to which the Central Intelligence Agency is under law primarily responsible. Of course, as we see today, intelligence is also made available to the Congress, as appropriate, to help in the legislative and appropriation processes.

Past history, as I suggested at the outset, is replete with instances where the intelligence was available but the intelligence officer funbled in the handling of it, as well as instances where the intelligence was properly reported but not heeded.

At various times over the past 40 years I have served in one capacity or another under every President of the United States, beginning with Woodrow Wilson, and generally in some capacity related to intelligence.

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One of the great and continuing advantages we have enjoyed over our history is that we have been led by men who have come to their high positions deeply imbued with the democratic processes. As a part of this our leaders have generally made themselves readily accessible to information from their subordinates and their intelligence officers. This feature of accessibility has been maintained by our Presidents despite the fact that the burdens on the Executive have been multiplying astronomically and the complexity of the problems before them, particularly in the field of our foreign relations, has been augmenting in geometric ratio. At the same time, the period within which decisions have to be made has been steadily decreasing.

During the last ten years that I have been in Washington, I have served under two Presidents of differing political parties. There never has been a time when the Director of Central Intelligence has not been able to get to the President in a matter of minutes on any issue that he considered of immediate importance.

Nor is this access limited to crises situations. On a daily basis we in the intelligence community have an opportunity to lay before the President and the leading officials of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council our appraisals of unfolding events of policy significance. This is supplemented by

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weekly oral briefings which I give to the National Security Council, covering important current events or dealing with the intelligence background of policy decisions that may be before the Council. Issues in our foreign relations these days do not always wait for the painstaking preparation of elaborate staff papers.

We have no reason to complain that we lack adequate opportunity to market our product. We have every incentive to see to it that our product contributes to our national security.

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Those who work on Intelligence, are sometimes viewed as Prophets of Gloom. Personally I am an optimist but also, I trust, a realist, as are my associates in the Intelligence Community. Sometimes we do have to be the harbingers of ill tidings because it is our duty to report on activities in other lands which might detrimentally affect our own national security.

Today we have on the world scene the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Communist Bloc with their dynamic industrial, economic and military programs, spearheading and directing communist parties, communist intrigues, and communist subversion on a world-wide basis. We must recognize that we face stern and relentless competition.

It is Khrushchev's present expressed intention that this should be competition short of all-out war, but whatever may be our views of

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his intentions, certainly no other "holds" will be barred. When he speaks of coexistence, it is the type of coexistence that will leave the Soviet free to press forward on their mission to Communize the world.

Today in the Free World, we have a great lead in our industrial and economic strength. It is more than twice that of the Soviet Union and if we include our Allies in the Free World, while adding to the Soviet the present potential of Communist China and the satellites, the lead of the Free World is still greater.

On the other hand the peoples in the Communist nations are being driven to work harder to make their communist system a universal one, than we are working to assure ourselves that these aggressive and subversive aims are defeated.

So far the Soviet have shown great ability to channel their growing resources into fields which build up their national power, including their military might. Their leaders have succeeded in persuading their people to be content with a much smaller share than we of consumers goods and of what we consider the essentials to a well-rounded life, so that they, the Soviets, can build up their heavy industry, turn out military hardware and have plenty left over to support International Communism. We believe that the value of their total annual military outlay approximately equals our own.

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There is no cause, therefore, for us to veiw the future with any easy complacency.

Most of you are in a field of work which is closely related to our national security. You have a keen knowledge both of our own potential and of the nature of the Soviet competition. As you return home from this Conference, I trust that you will review the problems we all face in the world of today and in the light of your own experience see whether you can come up with any further ideas as to how we can better prepare ourselves to meet the Soviet challenge within the framework of our free institutions.

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